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BootBench

BootBench is the dataset behind SoK: All You Ever Wanted to Know About Bootloader Security but Were Afraid to Ask, by Connor Glosner and Aravind Machiry (Purdue University), IEEE S&P 2026. It pairs open-source bootloader source trees with the vulnerabilities recorded against them, so that bootloader analysis tools can be evaluated against real bugs in real bootloaders.

Paper: PDF · DOI

What's here

Three submodules hold the data. tools/ builds it.

oss-bootloaders — the corpus. 63 bootloader repositories pinned as nested submodules and grouped by type (14 Type 1, 28 Type 2, 21 Type 3). Pointers only, nothing vendored. The SoK identified 43 bootloaders (§ 2.2) and studied 7 in depth (§ 3); the rest were added afterwards and have no mined data yet.

Two submodules are both named bootloader — type2/bootloader (rust-osdev) and type3/bootloader (wookey-project). Tooling keyed by directory name sees 62 distinct names, so the second is not scanned and has no wiki page.

bootloader_cve_db — 1,432 CVEs mined from the CVE Project records and assigned a bootloader type by keyword. Each type directory holds the full upstream record per CVE, an index (type<N>-results.json), the keyword breakdown that produced the classification, and generated statistics.

bootloader_vuln_commits — 3,514 commit records mined from those repositories at their pinned revisions: 390 that name a CVE and 3,124 matched on vulnerability keywords. That is down from 3,656 because re-mining removed 1,151 false positives — 95% of them the bare dos keyword matching "glados", "TODOs" and "DOS header" — while adding 843 from 17 newly-mined bootloaders. These are the security fixes that never got a CVE, which is most of them. cve-commit-links.json joins the two halves: 78 CVEs resolve to a fixing commit and to the parent revision that still contains the bug.

analysis-tools/ — 24 bootloader and firmware analysis tools as submodules, grouped by what they do: static analysis, fuzzing and rehosting, image inspection, platform assessment. These are what BootBench exists to evaluate.

oss-bootloaders/DEFENSES.md — what each bootloader defends itself with: Secure Boot, measured boot, signature verification, rollback protection, and the mitigations a build actually enables. 30 of the 62 scanned implement Secure Boot; 4 randomise their load address.

wiki/ — a page per bootloader with a timeline figure of its boot, covering the stages it runs through, how each stage passes state to the next, what it hands off, and why it is classified as it is; plus a page per analysis tool with a walkthrough. Start at wiki/Home.md.

tools/ — the collection, classification and validation tools, one document per tool in tools/docs/. tools/OVERVIEW.md is the table of which analysis tools work and which bootloaders each applies to.

scripts/ — the scripts you run: refresh a submodule, add to the corpus, and scripts/analysis/ to run an analysis tool against a bootloader. There is no CI in any BootBench repository; these replace it, and none of them commits or pushes.

PAPERS.md — bootloader papers from the eight venues the SoK surveyed, grouped by contribution.

Bootloader types

Everything is organised by the paper's three-way split, by how a bootloader initialises and hands off:

Type 1, firmware bootloader. Boots from hardware and presents a hardware-agnostic interface to whatever runs next. UEFI/EDK-II, SeaBIOS, coreboot.

Type 2, OS bootloader. Boots from an already-initialised system and prepares for an OS. GRUB2, shim, Windows Boot Manager.

Type 3, monolithic bootloader. Both jobs at once — hardware straight to OS, no handoff. Hardware-specific, common in embedded systems. U-Boot, MCUboot, ARM Trusted Firmware.

Types 1 and 2 chained together are staged booting, typical of desktops, servers and phones. Type 3 is monolithic booting, typical of IoT and MCU devices. The paper defines six attack surfaces over these types: invasive hardware, external hardware, remote access, persistent data sources, post-boot features and boot-time features.

Getting started

git clone https://github.com/BreakingBoot/BootBench.git
cd BootBench
git submodule update --init oss-bootloaders bootloader_cve_db bootloader_vuln_commits
./scripts/run-all-tools.sh

The three data submodules are small. Two other groups are large and optional:

git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init --recursive   # bootloader sources
git submodule update --init --recursive analysis-tools       # the analysis tools
git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init type1/edk2    # or just one

You need the bootloader sources only to re-mine commit histories or to run an analysis tool against source.

Using it

To run an analysis tool, use scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh. It works through docker, so the host needs no toolchain:

./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh --list            # what runs, what is blocked, why
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh codeql kexec-tools
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh angr /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/shimx64.efi

Of the 24 tools, 18 have runners verified against real targets. Seven of those needed a patch, a template or a specific container environment to run at all -- scripts/analysis/PATCHES.md documents each, and tools/OVERVIEW.md is the table of what works on which bootloader. The rest need a host database, specific silicon, or a commercial licence. That spread is the SoK's finding made concrete.

To evaluate a bug-finding tool, pick a fix commit from bootloader_vuln_commits and check out its parent. That parent is the last revision that still contains the bug, so it is the version to point a tool at; the fix commit itself is the ground truth for what the tool should find. Not every record is a usable target — many describe code paths since removed — so expect to select rather than run the whole set. The paper does the same, using seven bootloaders and one commit each.

To study a vulnerability class, start from bootloader_cve_db. Each entry carries structured cwe_ids and cvss alongside the free-text vuln_type, and a bootloaders field naming the corpus projects it affects — so "every GRUB CVE, CWE-787 only, high severity" is a filter rather than a reading exercise. stats.md breaks each type down by CWE, severity, attack vector and year.

To study defenses, start from oss-bootloaders/DEFENSES.md. It records what each bootloader implements and, for built artifacts, what its binary actually enables — the two are different claims and are kept apart.

To scope by attack surface or bootloader type, use the type directories. Type 1 is where the SMM and UEFI firmware bugs are, Type 2 has the Secure Boot bypasses, Type 3 the embedded and MCU work.

Before trusting a number, run validate_dataset.py. It currently passes every check. It exists because the dataset previously did not: withdrawn CVEs were still counted, two CVEs were counted under two types, statistics rows did not sum to their own totals, and previous_commit pointed at the next newer commit rather than the parent.

To go from a CVE to a vulnerable tree, use bootloader_vuln_commits/cve-commit-links.json. It resolves 78 CVEs to their fixing commit and to that commit's parent — the revision to check out to reproduce the bug. LINKS.md explains the coverage and why most CVEs have no linked fix.

Refreshing the data

There is no CI. Each repository has an update script that stages a refresh outside the submodule, prints a diff, and asks before writing:

./scripts/update-bootloader-cve-db.sh          # clones cvelistV5 if needed
./scripts/update-bootloader-vuln-commits.sh    # needs the full corpus checked out
./scripts/update-oss-bootloaders.sh
./scripts/update-papers.sh

Read the RELABELLED section before answering yes — those are CVEs that changed bootloader type. Nothing is committed or pushed; each script prints the git commands to publish what it changed. See scripts/.

Citing

@inproceedings{glosner2026bootloader,
  title     = {SoK: All You Ever Wanted to Know About Bootloader Security
               but Were Afraid to Ask},
  author    = {Glosner, Connor and Machiry, Aravind},
  booktitle = {2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S\&P)},
  year      = {2026},
  doi       = {10.1109/SP63933.2026.00163}
}

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