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design: gated passthrough for Muse (hold-connection approval PoC) - #13

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design/muse-gated-passthrough
Nov 16, 2026
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design/muse-gated-passthrough

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Design only. No code, no behaviour change. Refs #6.

Summary

A minimal proof of concept for gating Discord API calls made by Muse. A user creates a Muse custom connector pointing at our base URL with a caller-key header. Muse swaps its surrogate for the real Discord credential before the request reaches us. We do not swap or store credentials. We decide only whether to let the request through.

  • Passthrough route mode: the request is forwarded unchanged, including Authorization. The caller key travels in a dedicated header and is stripped before forwarding, along with front-added proxy headers.
  • Hold-the-connection approval: the gate holds the HTTP request open until a human approves or denies. Discord's response is returned to Muse unchanged. Muse needs no approval proof.
  • Routing: path prefix (/discord/api/v10/...). A route name maps to a fixed host in policy, never to a host from the request. Unknown names fail closed.
  • TLS and exposure: the proxy stays loopback-only. TLS terminates in a self-run tailscale serve on the owner's node, reachable only from Muse's node by ACL or tag. Tailnet identity headers are defence in depth and are stripped.
  • Approval plane: a separate listener, Basic auth realm, per-page CSRF token, CSP default-src 'none'. Token segments of /webhooks and /interactions paths are redacted in audit, page and notification.
  • Failure handling: a connect failure before any byte is sent returns 503. A failure after the request was written closes the connection and is audited. Approve returns only after the forward starts. Disconnects mark the hold abandoned. Duplicate holds are deduped. Cooldown defaults to 60 s.
  • Trust model: the real token transits the gate in this mode. The gate protects against the agent behind Muse, not against Muse itself. See the document for the stated limits.

Stage plan

  1. Stage 1, measurement and probes: a sleep probe (valid caller key, capped at 300 s) and a POST probe to record how Muse reacts to 423, 410, 503, timeouts, disconnects and retries, and whether tailscale serve interrupts a long idle connection.
  2. Stage 2, implementation: passthrough route, hold and approval plane, with the acceptance tests listed in the document.

Single-instance only for the PoC.

Open questions for the owner

Questions 1 to 4 block stage 1. The full list is in the document, section "Open questions". It includes:

  • Muse hold-timeout: how long Muse waits for a response before giving up, and what it does then (retry, error, surface to the user).
  • Whether a Muse connector accepts a base URL with a path prefix.
  • Whether Muse sends a request with no Authorization header when its swap fails.

Already answered by the owner: self-run TLS terminator, Basic auth plus CSRF for the approval page, cooldown on by default at 60 s.

Not to be merged until the owner has reviewed.

Design only. Passthrough route mode (no credential rewrite), header caller
key, remote listener behind a TLS terminator, hold-the-connection approval,
separate approval plane, trust-model changes, comparison with issue #5,
staged plan with acceptance tests, open questions for the owner.

Read: issues #5 (with comments), #6, #12; docs/design/phase1.md; README
Deployment models; ap-core policy/headers/canon/config/audit/error;
ap-proxy forward/pipeline/lib/listener and Cargo.toml (origin/main b3f7864).
Ran: git status/log, ls, grep for timeout/Semaphore/ConcurrencyLimit/
header_read/keepalive in ap-proxy and ap-core src. No build or tests;
nothing run against Muse or Discord.
Design only; no code. Verification: grep of the document for leftover
removed items and for hostnames or reviewer names; no tests apply.

Applied: header stripping and byte-for-byte definition, request deadlines,
separate caller-rejected status, hold dedupe and abandonment handling,
connect-failure outcomes, approve-after-forward semantics, PoC scope cuts,
stage 1 POST probe, path-token redaction, approval page details, identity
removal on reload, and extra stage 2 acceptance tests.

Owner answers applied: TLS terminated by a self-run terminator with a
loopback-only proxy; approval page uses Basic auth plus per-page CSRF
token; cooldown on by default at 60 s. Path-prefix routing with a fixed
route-to-host map.

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Owner review. I have read the full document. Overall: the design holds up, and I am fine with proceeding to stage 1 as planned. The sequencing is the strongest part of this proposal: measure Muse's behaviour first, build the approval machinery only after the unknowns are answered.

What matches the decisions already made:

  • Routing by name only; the upstream host comes from gate configuration, never from the request.
  • Discord's response returns to the caller on the same connection. The caller needs no polling endpoint and no result slot.
  • The approval plane is a separate listener with an independent credential, and the caller path has no route to it.
  • The #5 invariants survive in connection form: approval bound to one immutable entry whose digest is computed over the canonicalized request, single execution per entry, and expiry as a terminal recorded refusal (410, no Retry-After), not a state to poll.

The one trade-off I want to accept explicitly, since it is my decision to make (open question 11): this PoC supersedes the hash-bound one-time-proof path sketched for the platform-vault case. In this mode the real Discord token transits the gate and can rest in its memory for up to hold_secs. Section 4.3 states the resulting limit plainly (the gate constrains the agent, not the Muse platform itself), and the compensating controls in 4.2 are the right ones for a PoC: self-run TLS terminator, token never in audit, logs, pages or notifications, held requests in memory only and bounded. Accepted for the PoC, with the understanding that user-facing text for this mode carries the same wording as 4.3.

The kill risk is timing, and the document treats it correctly. The whole hold model depends on how long Muse waits before giving up, and on whether the TLS front cuts a long idle connection. Open question 1 being a stage 1 blocker, and the sleep probe running through the real tailscale serve front, are exactly right. If the measured window turns out to be shorter than a realistic human approval, the model dies there and stage 2 should not start.

Smaller points, none of them blockers:

  • Audit: forward_started is written before the send, which is the right order. Keeping Phase 1's behaviour that a failed audit write does not refuse the request leaves a narrow gap (an execution with no record) that is worth revisiting before this leaves PoC status.
  • Supersede: when a retry supersedes a held entry, the approver may be mid-read on the older one. The approval page should make a superseded entry visibly distinct, not just gone.
  • Attachments (question 12) need an explicit scope answer for the pilot: Discord file uploads are multipart and will exceed held_body_max_bytes. My default is out of scope for the pilot (denied by the cap) unless we decide otherwise.

Answers I can already give: question 7, Basic auth plus a per-page CSRF token for the PoC is fine, WebAuthn stays the later replacement, and the approval API staying client-agnostic is a requirement, not a preference. Question 9: refuse a held-route request with no Authorization before it reaches the human, as proposed. Question 3's termination point is already decided (section 4.2). Question 10 (exact pilot policy scope: message create only, or also replies, reactions, edits and deletes) I will answer separately before stage 2.

Not a merge approval: as the PR says, design first. Proceed with stage 1.

@ttmuse

ttmuse commented Nov 16, 2026

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Owner decision on scope, following up on my review: keep this PoC as small as possible. Validate first, expand later.

Concretely:

  • Stage 1 stays measurement only: the probes plus allow/deny passthrough. No approval machinery until open questions 1 to 4 are answered with measurements.
  • The pilot's write scope is a single pattern: POST /channels/*/messages (message create; replies go through the same endpoint). Reactions, edits, deletes and every other write pattern are out until the pilot proves out. This answers open question 10 for the pilot.
  • Attachments and multipart stay out of scope, denied by the held-body cap, as noted in my review.
  • One consumer (Muse), one upstream (Discord), single instance.
  • Expansion criteria: stage 1 measurements show Muse tolerates a held connection long enough for a realistic human approval and the TLS front does not cut it; the stage 2 acceptance tests pass on the single write pattern; the pilot then runs without surprises. Only after that do we widen the policy scope or add consumers.

And the inverse: if a probe result kills the hold model, we stop and rethink rather than broadening the design to route around it.

Single refusal table with X-AP-Decision on every gate refusal; verbatim response keeps upstream x-ap-*; one ordered header algorithm; framing policy; first-upstream-byte rule for allowed bodies; split disconnect cases and named detection mechanism; full-request dedupe with in-memory fingerprint; approval page headers; ACL shape and distinct ports; generic header debug record removed; tailnet identity headers ignored and stripped; pilot scope, stop rule and answered questions; proposed audit-failure requirement for writes.
Doc only; no build or tests run.
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Second-round review of docs/design/muse-gated-passthrough.md, applied in b61f925 and eda30fb (doc only, nothing built or run). Each finding and its fix:

MEDIUM

  • Outcome contract / requirement 5 over-claimed. Requirement 5 is reworded: X-AP-Decision is authoritative on every gate refusal, and deny and expiry also use 423 and 410. The 3.5 table is now the single list of refusals, each with status, decision value, code and the header. New rows: 400 canon, duplicate Authorization, credential_missing, compressed body, framing; 405/501; unknown route; body-read timeout.
  • Verbatim response. Upstream x-ap-* response headers are preserved. Gate refusals are identified by the locally generated status plus X-AP-Decision. Sections 1, 3.5 and 6 and the response tests are updated.
  • Allowed bodies after upstream bytes. Rule is first upstream request byte. Before it: 503 unavailable. After it: close with no synthetic decision, and audit forward_started without completed. Allowed chunked bodies are forwarded chunked; only held bodies get a computed length. Stage 1 item 13 and stage 2 test 28 cover this.
  • HTTP/1 smuggling. One framing policy before policy evaluation: Content-Length plus Transfer-Encoding, duplicate or comma-joined Content-Length, or a non-chunked Transfer-Encoding is 400 framing_refused. Whether hyper or the front already refuses these is tagged [A]. Stage 1 item 12 sends raw requests directly and through the front.
  • Disconnect while held had two answers. Split into (a) Abandoned before approve, where approve returns gone and audit shows abandoned, and (b) Approved first, where approve returns approved_but_abandoned and audit shows abandoned_after_approve. Case (b) is learned through a bounded oneshot. Test 8 is split the same way.
  • Disconnect mechanism. Named: under axum::serve the only signal is hyper dropping the handler future on read EOF, tagged [A], with the fallback stated (entry stays Pending, approve may forward to a gone caller). Stage 1 records the direct path and the front path.
  • Dedupe equality. Covers the full outbound semantic request including forwarded headers. An in-memory HMAC fingerprint covers credential values; the audit digest is redacted. Notification count is stated: one per distinct pending entry, and a superseding retry updates the existing notification. Admission order is cooldown, then dedupe, then caps.
  • Approval page. Every response now carries frame-ancestors 'none', form-action 'self', X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, Cache-Control: no-store, Pragma: no-cache and nosniff. Test 22 asserts them plus WWW-Authenticate.
  • ACL. Written in words: the Muse tag reaches the owner node's public port only, owner devices reach the approval port, and the Muse tag has no other grant. The two tailscale serve mappings use distinct ports, never path mounts. Stage 1 item 11 checks that Muse's node cannot reach any other port.
  • Credential-header contradiction (3.1). One ordered algorithm: of AUTH_HEADERS only Authorization is forwarded, and the keep list is empty by default. Test 2 sends Cookie, X-Api-Key and others and expects them absent.

LOW

  • Test 17 now separates a refused connect or failed handshake (503) from accept-then-reset (close).
  • The TCP keepalive row is retagged [A] as not a PoC control.
  • Expect: 100-continue claims are scoped to the direct path, and the drain skip rule is added.
  • Chunked allowed bodies: see the allowed-bodies item above.
  • Framing: see the smuggling item above.
  • Check order is specified (see dedupe).
  • Host behind the front is tagged [A]. Tailnet identity headers are ignored and stripped.
  • The stage 1 probe returns a status from the set 200, 410, 423, 503 with the matching header.
  • SIGTERM: only Pending entries get unavailable; entries past forward_started run to completion or the request deadline (test 26).
  • The generic header-length debug record is removed (restoring the round-1 cut). Stage 1 collects fixed fields only.
  • The optional test-table collapse was skipped, since it would not shorten the doc without risking cases. A table-driven refusal test (27) is added.

Review-comment scope decisions folded in

  • Pilot scope and stop rule section added. Write scope is POST /channels/*/messages only; attachments are out; stage 1 is measurement only. Questions 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are marked answered.
  • Section 4.3 wording is carried to user-facing text.
  • A superseded entry's page is visibly distinct (banner, controls disabled, link to the newest); tests 20 and 22 cover it.
  • Settled stage 2 requirement: on held write routes a failed forward_started audit write refuses the request (503 unavailable, audit_unavailable, nothing sent). Reads keep Phase 1 behaviour. Acceptance test 29 covers it.

Content-Type rule refuses attachments; stage 1 limited to allow/no_grant with held-route cases moved to stage 2; single-record audit for allowed requests, transitions for held; audit_unavailable applied at held write; two forward milestones; approve results table; deadline scope, 413 row, dedupe header assumption. Doc-only, no code run.
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Review of eda30fb (round 3), applied in 040821f. Design doc only, no code.

Attachments (MEDIUM)

  • The size cap does not keep small multipart uploads out of the pilot. Fix: held routes now require Content-Type: application/json (parameters allowed).
  • multipart/* and any other media type get 400 denied, code content_type, at any size (3.4 step 2, new 3.5 row).
  • Pilot scope and question 12 are reworded: the content-type rule refuses attachments and the cap independently bounds held bodies. [A] Muse sends JSON for message create.
  • Stage 2 test 15 now covers in-cap and over-cap multipart with zero upstream requests.

Stage 1 scope (MEDIUM)

  • Stage 1 acceptance 2 now asserts 423 no_grant for writes.
  • The held-route cases (credential_missing, content_encoding) moved to stage 2 test 15.
  • Duplicate Authorization is now refused on every passthrough route, so stage 1 can test it. 3.1, 3.8 and the 3.5 row agree.
  • Stage 1 forward_started assertions are replaced by the single-record audit codes.

Audit model (MEDIUM)

  • Allowed requests keep Phase 1's single record. A post-first-byte failure is that line with code = upstream_reset or body_failed_after_send.
  • Held requests use transitions. forward_started is written after the upstream connection is established and before the first request byte.
  • A connect failure is a terminal connect_failed transition with no forward_started.
  • connect_failed and audit_unavailable are added to the 3.9 transition list.
  • 3.1, 3.5, 5.1 and tests 17 and 29 are updated to match.

Audit-failure rule (MEDIUM, LOW)

  • The rule now also applies at the held write: 503 audit_unavailable before the entry is inserted or any notification fires.
  • The approve API has an explicit audit_unavailable result.
  • The two milestones are named separately in step 8: pre-send audit record written, then first request byte handed upstream. Only then does the approver oneshot resolve as success. Otherwise the result is approved_but_abandoned or audit_unavailable.
  • audit_unavailable starts no cooldown. The per-identity cap bounds prompts: none before the hold, one per attempt after approve.
  • Test 29 is extended for both failure points. Test 16 asserts the ordering.

Approve results (LOW)

  • New table of approve results per state, covering superseded (with the newest id), already_decided, expired, dropped, gone, approved_but_abandoned, approved_unconfirmed and audit_unavailable. I also added connect_failed, since a post-approve connect failure needed a result.
  • Test 7 now covers superseded and dropped.

Smaller items (LOW)

  • request_deadline_secs applies to allowed and approved requests. An approved one counts from forward_started. Test 25 is updated.
  • An allowed body over the cap before the first upstream byte now has a row: 413 body_too_large.
  • Dedupe depends on identical retry headers [A]. Stage 1 evidence now records whether two identical connector calls carry the same forwarded header names, and stage 2 may need a route-level fingerprint-exclusion list.
  • Test 2's Expect case runs on the direct path. The front's 100 Continue behaviour is a stage 1 record.
  • Size: net +36 lines (874 to 910). A duplicate superseded-page bullet and two duplicate audit sentences were removed. No new mechanisms.

Owner decisions are unchanged, and the document still contains no tailnet hostnames, IPs or logins. Not merging.

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chaodu-agent merged commit a921269 into main Nov 16, 2026
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